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Abstract
Using the framework of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (forthcoming), we present
a model of spatial takeoff that is calibrated using spatially-disaggregated occu-
pational data for England in c.1710. The model predicts changes in the spatial
distribution of agricultural and manufacturing employment which match data for
c.1817 and 1861. The model also matches a number of aggregate changes that
characterise the first industrial revolution. Using counterfactual geographical dis-
tributions, we show that the initial concentration of productivity can matter for
whether and when an industrial takeoff occurs. Subsidies to innovation in either
sector can bring forward the date of takeoff while subsidies to the use of land by
manufacturing firms can significantly delay a takeoff because it decreases spatial
concentration of activity.
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1 Introduction
Economic takeoff is often a starkly geographical phenomenon with leading
industries that are highly spatially concentrated and different regions that
are affected in different ways. Such spatial heterogeneities are not, however,
generally a part of the models we use to understand the timing and speed of
transition from slow-growing agricultural economies to fast-growing indus-
trial ones. As a result, we lack a framework for studying the dynamic effects
of policies that are bound up in geography, such as subsidies for industrial
hubs or expenditure on infrastructural development. This is partly because of
analytical difficulties to do with modelling geography, but it is also because
of a lack of sufficiently disaggregated data on the nature of spatial devel-
opment through an entire period of takeoff. Using new data that captures
the spatially-disaggregated nature of the industrial revolution in England,
this paper builds on recent advances in modelling spatial development to
construct a model of spatial takeoff.
Just how significant are geographical heterogeneities? Data for mod-
ern economies point to the importance of geography to the characterisation
of aggregate growth, growth in cities and in sub-national regions (see, for
example, Henderson et al., 2011). Historical data permit us to consider
spatial development during a broader structural transformation, however.
Using occupational data from parish-level records, the groundbreaking work
of Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) and the wider project described therein shows
that early industrial England was characterised by concentrated geographi-
cal ‘hotspots’ of population growth in areas that were predominantly man-
ufacturing based.1 That data quantifies a number of spatially-heterogenous
features of the first industrial revolution, such as the deindustrialisation of
the South of England during the eighteenth century.
Using the framework of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (forthcoming), this
paper introduces non-homothetic preferences into a dynamic model of en-
dogenous innovation in two sectors – agriculture and manufacturing – where
1To see this visually, see, e.g., Figure 4 ‘Population densities at quasi-parish
level for England and Wales c.1670 and 1800-1891’ on the project website:
http://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/occupations/englandwales1379-1911/.
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trade across a continuum of space is costly and where land is competed for
as a factor of production. Agglomeration and transport costs matter for the
locations of activity and the endogenous rate of technological progress in each
sector. Innovation is subject to a fixed cost and so investment in innovation
occurs when firms are large enough to amortize that cost over a sufficient
quantity of output. Since the manufacturing innovations that underpinned
the industrial revolution were energy-intensive, we make the assumption that
the fixed cost to innovating in the manufacturing sector is proportional to
the local energy costs. Those costs reflect both the location of natural re-
sources (coal) and the (non-uniform) costs of transporting it. The framework
is tractable enough for the model to be parameterised and for equilibrium
outcomes to be studied quantitatively. The most novel item we calibrate is
the initial spatial distribution of productivity in each sector. In particular,
we use new data in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) to estimate the geographical
distribution of employment for c.1710 and use that to calibrate the initial
distribution of productivity. We then compare the spatial predictions of the
model against the data for c.1817 and 1861 from Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b).
The model matches a number of the aggregate and geographically het-
erogenous aspects of the first industrial revolution over the period 1710–1860.
Initial innovation in agricultural production is concentrated in the South,
around the population of London (cf. Allen, 2004). That slowly increases
demand for the consumption of manufactured goods and leads to the emer-
gence of manufacturing firms in the North with an associated migration of
labor to work there. Once those firms reach a sufficient scale, manufacturing
innovation begins endogenously. The takeoff in per capita growth proceeds
at a time and place that matches the data. The ability to capture the struc-
tural change that results from agricultural innovation is much like in Desmet
and Parente (2012). We establish, however, that the spatially heterogenous
nature of the economy was critical to whether and when an industrial takeoff
occurs by simulating the model with a series of counterfactual geographical
environments. We also look at the role of policy: Subsidies to manufacturing
innovation bring forward the date of industrial takeoff and locate it closer
to the source of cheap energy. In contrast, a subsidy to the use of land by
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manufacturing firms can significantly delay takeoff because it lowers the spa-
tial concentration of manufacturing firms. We also find a significant role for
international trade in explaining the timing of takeoff.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reports evidence
on the industrial takeoff in England and connects that to some extant models
of takeoff. Section 3 introduces the model of spatial takeoff, which is based
on Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (forthcoming). The model is parameterised
in Section 4 with equilibrium outcomes compared against the record for the
first industrial revolution in Section 5. Section 6 considers a number of
counterfactual initial distributions for manufacturing productivity. Section 7
considers the impact of including international trade and Section 8 looks at
a number of policy interventions. Section 9 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The First Industrial Revolution
It is worth going over the macroeconomic facts of the industrial revolution
before turning to its spatially-heterogenous characteristics. The industrial
revolution may be characterised by an aggregate shift of employment and
incomes from agricultural to industrial activities along with a sustained in-
crease in per capita output growth. We focus mainly on these two charac-
teristics, though the quantitative modelling exercise in Section 5 will look to
fit additional historical data for relative prices, wages and land rents.
2.1 Per Capita Growth and Employment Shares
The revisionist2 view of per capita growth during the first industrial revolu-
tion, summarised in Crafts and Harley (1992) and reported in Table 1, has
established that growth in the eighteenth century was more muted than once
thought: A significant increase in aggregate growth was not observed until
the second quarter of the nineteenth century. The Crafts-Harley view in turn
2Cf. Deane and Cole (1967); the revisionist view is now generally accepted (see Mokyr,
2004) and has been confirmed under different methodologies (e.g., Antra`s and Voth, 2003).
An alternative perspective, which suggests somewhat higher growth in the early eighteenth
century, is presented in Clark (2007).
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implies that England was far wealthier than once thought as far back as the
early 18th Century and that the macro-inventions of the eighteenth century
took a long time to make an impact upon aggregate per capita growth.
Table 1: Estimates of percentage growth of per capita real output in Britain
1700–60 1760–1800 1800–30 1830–70
Crafts and Harley (1992) 0.3 0.17 0.52 1.98
From Mokyr (2004)
The best estimates we have for employment shares during the period are
from Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) which is based on occupational records from
1,000 baptismal registers for c.1710 and over 10,000 registers for subsequent
years.3 Table 2 reports estimates for male employment shares according
to the primary-secondary-tertiary (PST) classification system described in
Wrigley (2010b).4 The substantial proportion of labor in the secondary sector
during the eighteenth century, increasing by only eight percentage points over
160 years, is striking.
Table 2: Estimates of male employment shares in England
c.1710 1817 1851 1871
labor in primary 43.4% 38.9% 30.7% 25.2%
labor in secondary 38.7% 42.2% 45.3% 46.8%
From Shaw-Taylor, et al., (2010)
Combined with the relatively muted growth up until 1830, these data
present a problem for models of growth where the labor shift is the industrial
takeoff. Matsuyama (1992) relates industrial takeoff to the labor released by
3The earlier perspective on employment shares is that reported in Crafts (1994), which,
for the eighteenth century, is based on a reworking of Lindert and Williamson (1982) that
uses data from up to 50 parish registers. We focus on the newer data in Shaw-Taylor
et al. (2010b) here. This data is provisional and subject to some revision, but this sample
dwarfs the number of registers on which the Crafts (1994) data is based.
4The PST classification is based on the income elasticity of demand for each type of
good: Primary sector goods (agriculture, mining, fishing) generally have income elasticity
less than one; secondary (manufacturing, construction) more than one, but less than
tertiary (services, transport). See Figure 2 in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b).
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increases in agricultural productivity while Gollin et al. (2002) parameterise a
model in this spirit. The pace of transition is limited by the rate at which la-
bor is released from agriculture. Other papers, such as Hayashi and Prescott
(2008), emphasize early manufacturing innovation in raising wages, increas-
ing incentives for labor to migrate out of agriculture. Yang and Zhu (2009)
focus on the role of manufacturing innovation in modernising agricultural
production, thus releasing labor and permitting industrial takeoff. From this
perspective, the transition is a contemporaneous relationship between more
labor in manufacturing and higher aggregate growth, a pattern not observed
during the first industrial revolution.
Agricultural productivity did play a role, however, in advance of the wider
industrial takeoff. Allen (2004) finds that agricultural output per worker
doubled between 1600 and 1750. Enclosures of farms, increases in farm size
and improvements in farming methods drove an agricultural revolution in
advance of the industrial revolution. That there is little contemporaneous
contribution of agricultural productivity improvements to the industrial take-
off is consistent with the evidence on the real wages of farm workers in Clark
(2001). Agricultural innovation may have been enough to take employment
shares to their early eighteenth century levels, but that was not sufficient to
generate industrial takeoff alone.
We could start to understand these macroeconomic data in the context
of an endogenous growth model where employment shares and agricultural
innovations are only a part of the conditions necessary for the takeoff of
industrial productivity. That an endogenous growth story is necessary fits
with the recent thesis in Allen (2009) that the English advantage was in the
high wages relative to low energy costs that created incentives to develop and
implement the new labor-saving technologies which underpinned the takeoff
in aggregate growth. There is evidence that the patterns of employment and
innovation were not independent of geographical space, however. A proper
accounting for endogenous innovation decisions through the industrial takeoff
can thus incorporate an explicit role for geography.
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2.2 Spatial Heterogeneities
A number of studies, such as Cottrell (1980), Langton (1984) and Hudson
(1989), have pointed out that beneath the aggregate changes that charac-
terise the first industrial revolution are differences in the intensity and dy-
namics of economic activity across space. We can consider the spatial distri-
bution of economic activity and the distribution of coal.
The advantage of the Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) data is the ability to
disaggregate geographically the employment shares and their changes over
time. In Section 4 we use this data to calibrate the initial productivity
levels in the model and to compare simulation output against the record.
Here, a few key findings of Shaw-Taylor et al. can be summarised. First,
the industrial economic geography of England was already established by
the mid-eighteenth century. That economic geography was characterised by
‘hotspots’ of activity and high population growth in small manufacturing
areas, mostly in the North of England. Two counties, Lancashire and the
West Riding of Yorkshire, are estimated to have had 65–70% of adult male
labor employed in the secondary sector as early as 1750. Those hotspots
later underpinned the wider industrial revolution, but the concentration of
activity persisted: Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley (2008) show that even as late
as 1851, 60% of the national labor force in the secondary sector was located
in less 17.7% of registration districts.5 The evidence for the UK in Wrigley
et al. (1997) is that geographical differences in population growth resulted
largely from migration rather than differential fertility and mortality rates.6.
During the eighteenth century, the share of labor employed in the sec-
ondary sector increased in the North while it decreased in the South. North-
ern counties taken as a whole increase the secondary employment share
5The registration district is an administrative unit between parish and county. Clearly
these will be of different geographical size since there will be some balancing out of pop-
ulation per district. Because more densely populated districts are likely to be the smaller
districts this figure of 17.7% districts will be an over-estimate of the corresponding pro-
portion of land.
6Regional differences in fertility and death rates were relatively minor. Rural-urban
differences in fertility rates were not significant, while differences in mortality rates go in
the wrong direction to help explain the patterns in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b)
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from 47 to 62% between c.1710 to 1817, while primary employment declines;
Southern counties experience the opposite, a deindustrialisation of the labor
force from 39 to 28% share while the primary share increases (see Shaw-
Taylor et al., 2010b; Tables 6 and 7).7
Differences in wages across the country point to the drivers of migra-
tion. As Hunt (1986) describes, up to the mid-eighteenth century high wage
counties were found in the South and East, with low wage counties in the
North. That situation is reversed by the end of the eighteenth century, with
an acceleration in the Northern real wages relative to the Southern ones also
shown in Clark (2001). That early wage advantage in the South is consistent
with other evidence that the agricultural improvements which predated the
industrial takeoff of the nineteenth century were concentrated in the South of
England. Allen (2004) reports that, at least in terms of the scale of farming,
agricultural producers in Southern parts of England were the more efficient
through the eighteenth century. Shaw-Taylor (2005) shows that consistent
differences in farm scale persist into the mid-nineteenth century.
As noted by Wrigley (2010a, p.206), the industrial revolution would not
have been possible without ‘breaking free from dependence upon photosyn-
thesis... coal provided the escape route’. The innovations in textiles which
underpinned the industrial revolution were highly energy-intensive and relied
on a supply of cheap energy. While Clark and Jacks (2007) argues convinc-
ingly that technological change in the extraction of coal was not responsible
for the industrial revolution, Allen (2009) emphasises that the location of
that coal and the costs of transporting it could matter to industrial firms’
decisions about investments in new technologies. In England, the major
source of coal was in the North, around Newcastle and in Lancashire. The
large, pre-industrial coal trade entailed the transport of coal from the North
to London for heating of domestic and commercial premises. Allen (2009)
and Clark and Jacks (2007) put the cost of coal in London at seven times
that in Newcastle. Moreover, as indicated in Allen (2009), the costs of trans-
7For these calculations, Northern counties are Cheshire, Lancashire and all of Yorkshire.
Southern counties are Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire,
Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire, Rutland and Wiltshire.
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porting that coal was not uniform. In particular, transport infrastructure
was better in the North of England. Bagwell (1974, p.15) locates the ‘cradle
of the canal age proper’ to early eighteenth century Lancashire. We can also
see this in the Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a) data for c.1817: In the North of
England, 6.0% of adult male labor was engaged in transportation services
while in the South the share is only 2.8%. Until the arrival of railways in the
mid-nineteenth century, transportation South of the Midlands of England
was costly and this was reflected in high prices in London.
To summarise, the early economic geography of England was established
well in advance of what we normally think of as the industrial revolution
and remained relatively stable. Aggregate changes in employment shares re-
sulted mainly from migration from agricultural areas to highly concentrated
hotspots of industrial activity in the North. The share of labor employed in
industry is high well in advance of the takeoff in aggregate growth. Agricul-
tural productivity improvements occurred in advance of the takeoff and away
from the Northern hotspots. A significant deindustrialisation of the South
occurred in advance of the wider takeoff in growth that occurred into the
nineteenth century. Finally, the location of coal was highly concentrated in
the North and the cost of transporting it across the country was large and
non-uniform.
3 A Model of Spatial Takeoff
To capture the detail of the geographical heterogeneity noted above we need a
model of continuous space. Important contributions to understanding space
and agglomeration have been made in models featuring a small number of
countries or regions (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991). In such models, the
fixed number of distinct spatial units must remain small to retain tractability
and so the generality of such models is limited. They are unable to capture
the rich evolution of spatial patterns we see in reality. Models of space with a
continuum of regions such as Fujita et al. (2001) can capture the finer detail of
spatial patterns, but have not yielded models that can generate quantitative
predictions that can be compared with data. Compounding these difficulties
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in the context of development is the need to model the evolution of space over
time. Recent attempts to understand such problems in a general way have
made progress (e.g., Boucekkine et al., 2009) but omit important features
such as trade costs, are highly complex and have generated few clear insights.
A recent approach that retains tractability and can be taken to data is
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (forthcoming; henceforth DR-H). In that model,
firms are located at a point in one-dimensional space and use land and labor
to produce manufacturing goods or services. The costliness of trade across
space and local diffusion of technology encourages agglomeration while con-
gestion from diminishing returns to labor at each location encourages dis-
persion. At each point in space that tension determines economic activity.
Such models are hard to solve because the distribution of activity determines
the amount of trade between locations, while the costliness of that trade de-
termines firm decisions. Rossi-Hansberg (2005) provides a tractable solution
concept that can be computed numerically. The advance in DR-H is that
firms can invest in risky innovation to expand potential output. Ordinarily,
the investment decision of firms would mean that the firm problem is a dy-
namic one, but DR-H shows how, under assumptions on diffusion and factor
mobility, firm decisions about investing in new technology can be modelled in
a static way at the same time as having dynamic implications. Manufactur-
ing and services endogenously grow at a constant rate in the long-run. The
model is able to match a number of quantitative and qualitative features of
spatial development in the US over the period 1980-95.
The model of spatial takeoff in this paper is an extension of the DR-H
framework to non-homothetic preferences and different costs to innovation in
each sector. By parameterising this model, we are able to match a number of
the macroeconomic features of the first industrial revolution as well as some
geographical heterogeneities of structural transformation. Subsequent work
will look to extend this work to consider a number of issues that mattered
historically and today. In particular, there is no capital, so growth results
solely from technological progress. Finally, there is no population change
and takeoff does not occur following a demographic transition in the manner
of a unified growth theory such as Galor (2005) or Desmet and Parente
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(2012). Each of these are clearly important to a fuller picture, but some
evidence suggests we might neglect them in a first look at the importance of
space to takeoff: For example, Mokyr (2004) attributes 70-80% of aggregate
growth over the period to TFP; Wrigley et al. (1997) does not find significant
geographical differences in birth and death rates in England over the period.
Nevertheless, incorporating these additional issues into future work will be
necessary to provide a more complete picture of the role of geography in
economic takeoff and its relevance in low income countries today.
3.1 Preferences, Geography and Labor
As in DR-H, the economy is composed of firms that are geographically or-
dered on the closed interval [0, 1]. A location is a point ℓ ∈ [0, 1], and the
density of land at each point is one, so the total mass of land is also one.
Agents are infinitely-lived, perfectly mobile and provide labor inelastically.
We treat the total number of agents as a fixed number L¯. Each agent holds
a diversified portfolio of land and firms, with per agent land rents R¯(t)/L¯.
An agent in location ℓ at time t receives wage w(ℓ, t). Agents have pref-
erences over the consumption of agricultural and manufacturing goods, cA
and cM respectively. Consumption takes place from the location ℓ at which
they work and so can involve the costly transportation of goods from the
producer. Agents choose consumption bundles to solve,
max
{cA(ℓ,t),cM (ℓ,t)}
∞
0
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU (cA(ℓ, t), cM(ℓ, t)) (1)
s.t. w(ℓ, t) +
R¯(t)
L¯
= pA(ℓ, t)cA(ℓ, t) + pM(ℓ, t)cM(ℓ, t), ∀(ℓ, t),
where pi(ℓ, t) are prices for each i ∈ {A,M} and U(·) is the instantaneous util-
ity function. There is no storage good. We impose Stone-Geary preferences
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in order to capture the structural transformation away from agriculture,8
U(cA(ℓ, t), cM(ℓ, t)) = (cA(ℓ, t)− γ)
η(cM(ℓ, t))
1−η, (2)
with γ > 0 and η ∈ (0, 1). Optimisation for each (ℓ, t) implies,
c∗M(ℓ, t) =
pA(ℓ, t)
pM(ℓ, t)
(1− η)
η
(cA(ℓ, t)− γ), (3)
c∗A(ℓ, t) =
[
w(ℓ, t) +
R¯(ℓ, t)
L¯
+ pA
(1− η)
η
γ
]
η
pA(ℓ, t)
. (4)
The Stone-Geary preferences mean that the marginal utility from the con-
sumption of agricultural goods falls as consumption grows, increasing the
optimal share of consumption of manufactured goods. Labor is free to move
in advance of productivity realisations. As such, equilibrium prices, wages
and rental income are such that agents in all locations receive the same utility,
u¯(t), at a given point in time.
3.2 Technology and Innovation
At each point in time firms specialise in one sector. Each location houses one
firm of the sector that will pay the highest rent for the land. Firms produce
either agricultural or manufacturing goods, A(ℓ, t) or M(ℓ, t), using labor
and one unit of land,
A(ℓ, t) = ZA(ℓ, t)LA(ℓ, t)
α, (5)
M(ℓ, t) = ZM(ℓ, t)LM(ℓ, t)
µ, (6)
8The advantage of the Stone-Geary preferences is that it allows us to capture a shift
away from agriculture that results simply from greater overall consumption, first via agri-
cultural innovation and then (more rapidly) via manufacturing innovation. Alternatives
include preferences a` la Sato (1977), where weights on each type of consumption in a
CES utility specification are a function of, for example, income or wealth. Laitner (2000)
imposes that marginal utility from agricultural good consumption is zero once a minimum
amount is reached. For the industrial revolution in Britain, Crafts (1985) estimates the
income elasticity of agricultural good consumption to be 0.7, so the Stone-Geary specifica-
tion captures the idea that agricultural consumption will increase, but that the proportion
decreases as income grows.
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where α < µ would reflect greater land-intensiveness in agriculture. For
i ∈ {A,M}, Zi(ℓ, t) are sector-, time- and location-specific productivity levels
and Li(ℓ, t) is labor employed by sector i at location ℓ in time t.
Between time periods technology diffuses across space, declining with
distance according to parameter δ. A firm at location ℓ has access at the
start of time t to a Zi that is the maximum of all other spatially-diffused
past productivities (including their own),
Zi(ℓ, t) = max
r∈[0,1]
e−δ|ℓ−r|Zi(r, t− 1). (7)
Observing the start of period technology endowment, firms choose whether
and how much to invest in innovation which could increase Zi(ℓ, t). Each firm
in sector i can decide to buy a probability φ of innovation at a cost ψi(φ). A
firm that succeeds in innovating draws a zˆ ≥ 1 from a Pareto distribution,
Pr[zˆ > z] =
(
1
z
)ai
, (8)
where ai > 1 is sector dependent: aA > aM implies that the average manu-
facturing innovation is greater than the average agricultural innovation. The
zˆ > 1 that arrives yields new technology level zˆZi(ℓ, t). The expected value
of that innovation increment is E(zˆ) = (ai/(ai − 1)). A firm that chooses to
invest expects to obtain increment E(zˆ) with probability φ and no increment
with probability (1− φ). So the expected technology for a firm that invests
is,
E(Zi(ℓ, t)|Zi) =
(
φ
ai
ai − 1
+ (1− φ)
)
Zi =
(
φ
ai − 1
+ 1
)
Zi. (9)
We assume that the innovation draws are spatially correlated such that firms
arbitrarily close to each other receive the same innovation.9
Deciding the path of innovation investment is the only potentially dy-
9If that were not the case, an infinite number of individual unbounded innovation
draws combined with continuous technology diffusion would lead to infinite productivity
in all cases. For the purposes of the numerical exercises, it is sufficient that we split the
continuum of locations into a finite number of ‘counties’, within which each firm obtains
the same realisation (see DR-H).
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namic problem. Given diffusion, profits from an innovation draw are lost in
the next period because new entrants can compete with the same technol-
ogy. Labor is chosen optimally and land is competitive, so rents are such that
firms make zero expected profits. Then, the optimal investment in innovation
maximises the current payoff (see Proposition 1 in DR-H),
max
φ
pi(ℓ, t)
(
φ
ai − 1
+ 1
)
ZiLˆi(ℓ, t)
ı − w(ℓ, t)Lˆi(ℓ, t)− Rˆi(ℓ, t)− ψ(φ(ℓ, t)),
(10)
where ı = {α, µ} and Lˆi is optimal Li and Rˆi is the competitive rental rate
bid. A firm that chooses to invest in innovation thus sets φi to maximise the
expected net current-period gain from investing,
max
φi
pi(ℓ, t)
(
φi
ai − 1
)
ZiLˆi(ℓ, t)
ı − ψ(φi(ℓ, t)), (11)
Following DR-H, we assume that there can be both fixed and marginal costs
to firms that wish to innovate. We assume that these costs can differ across
sectors. In agriculture, the fixed costs are constant across space. In manufac-
turing, the fixed costs are related to the cost of energy which can vary. The
distinguishing feature of the rapidly-growing sectors in the industrial revo-
lution was their application of energy-intensive technological improvements
(see, e.g., Deane and Cole, 1967). As such, we impose that manufacturing
firms that innovate also incur energy costs,
ψi(φ) =

 ψ1,i + ψ2,i
(
1
1− φ
)
+ Γiξ(ℓ) if φ > 0
0 if φ = 0
, (12)
where ξ(ℓ) is the energy cost at location ℓ, ψ1,i > 0 and ψ2,i > 0 and Γi = 1
if i = M and 0 otherwise. So firms invest in innovation if the net gain is
strictly positive,
φi(ℓ, t) =


0 if ψi(φ
∗
i (ℓ, t)) ≥ pi(ℓ, t)
(
φ∗
i
(ℓ,t)
ai−1
)
ZiLˆi(ℓ, t)
ı
φ∗i (ℓ, t) if ψi(φ
∗(ℓ, t)) < pi(ℓ, t)
(
φ∗
i
(ℓ,t)
ai−1
)
ZiLˆi(ℓ, t)
ı
,
(13)
14
where,
φ∗i (ℓ, t) = 1−
(
ψ2,i(ai − 1)
pi(ℓ, t)Zi(ℓ, t)Lˆi(ℓ, t)ı
)1/2
, (14)
is the solution to (11) given the cost structure (12). Notice that there is
a scale effect in the innovation probability: The more labor in a location,
the greater the (chosen) probability of obtaining an innovation. Like DR-H,
in simulations we make ψ(·) proportional to wages and we make the energy
cost, ξ, proportional to firm output. The first assumption ensures that the
cost of innovation grows if the economy grows (and so wages increase); the
second means that energy costs do not become trivial as firms become large.
3.3 Transport, Land and Goods Markets
Transport of a good across land incurs an iceberg cost: Only e−κ|ℓ−r| of a
good produced at ℓ arrives at r. Under those conditions, prices must satisfy,
pi(r, t) = e
κ|ℓ−r|pi(ℓ, t), (15)
so then the price of a good increases in the distance that it has to be shipped
(the buyer at r is paying for more to be produced at ℓ than he is actually
consuming). Land goes to a firm in the sector that values it most,
R(ℓ, t) = max{RA(ℓ, t), RM(ℓ, t)}. (16)
Let θi(ℓ, t) = 1 if firm the firm at ℓ produces in sector i at time t. Equi-
librium in goods markets must take account of the transport cost. After
Rossi-Hansberg (2005), let Hi(ℓ, t) denote the stock of excess supply of good
i between locations 0 and ℓ. We define Hi(ℓ, t) by Hi(0, t) = 0 and the partial
differential equation,
∂Hi(ℓ, t)
∂ℓ
= θixi(ℓ, t)− ci(ℓ, t)
(∑
i
θi(ℓ, t)Lˆi(ℓ, t)
)
− κ|Hi(ℓ, t)|, (17)
where κ > 0 and xi(ℓ, t) is net production of i at ℓ. The expression (17) has
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two components: First, excess supply of a good increases at a location ℓ by
the amount of production in that sector less consumption in that location of
that good. Second, if excess supply of a good is positive it must be shipped
further and thus diminishes according to the transport cost at rate κ; if it is
negative, it must become more negative to account for the loss of goods being
shipped in the opposite direction (that is, gross excess demand increases). A
consideration of differences in transport costs across the economy and across
sectors would permit a consideration of differences in infrastructure supply.
For this model we maintain κ to be constant. Equilibrium in the goods
market is thus defined by Hi(1, t) = 0 for each i and all t.
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that the sum of labor allocated
in each sector across space, that is,
∫ 1
0
∑
i
θi(ℓ, t)Lˆi(ℓ, t)dℓ = L¯. (18)
An equilibrium is defined as optimal consumption decisions by agents at
each ℓ and for all t, as well as optimal labor purchases by firms, optimal price-
, land rent- and wage-setting by firms, and optimal innovation decisions.
Excess supply of each good is zero at the location ℓ = 1 and total labor
employed is equal to total labor supply.
4 Calibration
Our focus in the initial quantitative exercise is to match 150 periods of sim-
ulation output against 150 years of data covering 1710-1860. Prior to the
takeoff in aggregate per capita growth there was a degree of specialisation of
the North in industry and the South in agriculture. As described above, the
North of England appeared to industrialise in terms of employment shares in
the eighteenth century while the South deindustrialised. Moreover, the slow
technological change in agriculture happened in advance of the wider takeoff
and appears to have been concentrated in the South of England.
The key part of model initialisation is establishing the initial productivity
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distribution in each sector along an interval. We treat the economic geogra-
phy of England as a one-dimensional North-South line and infer the initial
productivity levels in each sector across space along that line using data on
occupational geography. In simulations, this interval is treated as a discrete
number of spatial units, which we set to be 500. Figure 1 depicts such a 500-
unit interval against a map of England with ℓ = 1 being the Southern tip
(Scilly Isles) and ℓ = 500 the Northern (Berwick upon Tweed). The method
of extracting productivity levels is to first sum observed labor in each of the
500 units along the East-West dimension. We can then obtain initial produc-
tivity levels consistent with that distribution of labor.10 Shaw-Taylor et al.
(2010a) contains occupational information at c.1710 for around 10% of the
total number of just over 11,000 parishes. The first step is thus to construct
an estimate of the complete occupational geography of England in c.1710.
4.1 Constructing c.1710 data
The c.1710 data in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010a) includes occupational data for
adult males in 1,062 of the 11,102 ancient parishes in England. Kitson et al.
(2012) describes the creation of a complete ‘census’ of adult male employment
in England for c.1817, with data matched into the same spatial units as
the c.1710 data. To infer missing observations in the c.1710 data, we: 1)
Build a regression model of the early period occupational data using the
late-period data; 2) use coefficient estimates from those regressions to infer
missing data in the c.1710 period; and, 3) aggregate up to a larger spatial
unit (624 registration districts) in order to reduce noise and limit the margin
for error in the estimates. This works relatively well: The OLS regression of a
double-log specification of c.1710 employment on c.1817 employment, c.1817
occupational data and geographical characteristics11 obtains an R2 of 0.82.
Similarly, the regression models at the level of primary (excluding mining)
10I thank a referee for suggesting this method of inferring productivity levels.
11The regression is specified as a double-log. Given the large degrees of freedom, we in-
clude a number of independent variables and their interactions: Log of late period popula-
tion, primary, secondary, tertiary, mining and textiles as well as geographic characteristics
such as log of parish area, latitude, longitude and distance from London.
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and secondary employment perform well, with R2 = 0.57 and R2 = 0.66,
respectively. A fuller analysis of this data will be the subject of future work,
but Figure 2 depicts the distribution of labor along the North-South interval.
The concentration of labor in London is clearly visible around ℓ = 135.
4.2 Initial productivity levels
We do not have spatial data for capital, so all differences in productivity are
inferred from the distribution of labor. For any (ℓ, t),
ZM(ℓ, t) =
L1−µM (ℓ, t)
µ
w(ℓ, t)
pM(ℓ, t)
, (19)
ZA(ℓ, t) =
L1−αA (ℓ, t)
α
w(ℓ, t). (20)
We can use the distribution depicted in Figure 2 for LM(ℓ, 0) and LA(ℓ, 0) but
there are two further issues in calculating (19)-(20) to initialise the model:
First, we do not know pM(ℓ, 0), w(ℓ, 0); and, second, a reasonable diffusion
parameter with the productivity levels implied by the labor present in London
would mean a large jump in productivity between period 1 and 2. As such,
we take the following approach including a date 0 diffusion:
1. Use (19)-(20) to calculate ZM(ℓ, 0), ZA(ℓ, 0) given c.1710 observations
for LM(ℓ, 0), LA(ℓ, 0) and an initial guess for pM(ℓ, 0), w(ℓ, 0).
2. Apply diffusion on ZM(ℓ, 0), ZA(ℓ, 0) to obtain Z˜M(ℓ, 0), Z˜A(ℓ, 0).
3. Using Z˜M(ℓ, 0), Z˜A(ℓ, 0) and initial guesses pM(ℓ, 0), w(ℓ, 0), solve the
model for LˆA(ℓ, 0), LˆM(ℓ, 0), pˆM(ℓ, 0) and wˆ(ℓ, 0) under no innovation.
4. Use (19)-(20) to calculate ZˆM(ℓ, 0), ZˆA(ℓ, 0) given LˆA(ℓ, 0), LˆM(ℓ, 0),
pˆM(ℓ, 0) and wˆ(ℓ, 0).
5. Pass ZˆM(ℓ, 0), ZˆA(ℓ, 0) to date 1 of full model.
Although an initial guess is made for prices and wages, by making sure that
the model solves at stage 3. we ensure we have a distribution of productivity
in each sector that captures the observed labor distribution plus prices and
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wages that solve the model. As an example, Figure 3 depicts the initial
productivity levels obtained for the simulation in Section 5.
4.3 Other parameter values
Table 3 reports the values of other parameters. The preference parameters
γ and η are chosen such that the aggregate employment shares match the
Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) data for c.1710–1861.12 So parameterised, the
Stone-Geary preferences and generate initial structural change and a constant
long-run employment share in agriculture of 20%. Clearly other forms of
preferences could replicate the larger decline of that share into the twentieth
century, but this is sufficient for the period of study here. The manufacturing
innovation parameter, aM , corresponds to the long-run growth rate of around
2%; that for agriculture, aA, produces a long-run rate of growth consistent
with a slow growth in agricultural output, less than the doubling every 150
years noted in Allen (2004). Agriculture is relatively more land intensive than
manufacturing so µ > α; we use the numbers in Valentinyi and Herrendorf
(2008). The transport cost parameter κ = 0.008 generates a spatial focus
to productivity investments and the diffusion parameter, δ = 15 affects the
speed of takeoff and so helps fit the labor shift and aggregate growth takeoff.
The innovation cost functions are parameterised with the same marginal
cost parameter across each sector as in DR-H, ψ2,i = 0.002. We choose the
fixed cost parameters to reflect the evidence on agricultural revolution predat-
ing the industrial one. Setting ψ1,A = 0.5832 locates the takeoff agricultural
productivity at t = 1, and ψ1,M = 0.9340 means no initial manufacturing
innovation. The energy costs reflect the evidence in Clark and Jacks (2007)
and Allen (2009) that energy prices in London were around seven times that
in London, a ratio that remained relatively stable through the eighteenth
century. Allen (2009) provides 1700 relative coal energy prices for North-
east, Western UK and London at 7.28, 6.24 and 1, respectively. We locate
those prices to the peaks in coal supply at Newcastle (ℓ = 428), at Lan-
12There is no tertiary sector in the model, so the shares we look to match are based on
the primary:secondary ratio, i.e., declining from 53% to 35% over the period.
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cashire (ℓ = 305) and the population peak in London (ℓ = 136).13 Coal
was transported from the coalfields in the North to the population centre in
the South, so prices increased as they approach London; we project relative
energy prices between and outwith these locations based on the implied ice-
berg cost. Finally, we let the innovation cost of energy be a proportion of
manufacturing output, normalised to 0.05 at ℓ = 305.
The price of agricultural goods is the numeraire, pA(:, t) = 1 for all t.
Table 3: Parameterisation
β 0.95 Standard discount factor.
η 0.2 To match aggregate employment shares over
1710-1860 in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b).γ 0.06
δ 15 To match speed of takeoff in Crafts and Harley
(1992).
κ 0.008 Consumption good transport cost in Desmet and
Rossi-Hansberg (forthcoming).
aM 70 Long-run growth of 2%, Heston et al. (2011).
aA 295 Slow early agricultural growth rate, Allen (2004).
α 0.59 Firm-level employment share for agriculture in
Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008).
µ 0.67 Firm-level employment share for manufactured
consumption in Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008).
ψ1,A 0.5832 A takeoff in agriculture at t = 1.
ψ1,M 0.9340 Timing of manufacturing takeoff as in Crafts and
Harley (1992).
ψ2,A, ψ2,M 0.002
ξ(ℓ) See text Coal prices from Allen (2009), Clark and Jacks
(2007).
ZA(ℓ, 0) See text Data in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) and own
working.ZM(ℓ, 0)
L¯ 100 Normalised total labor supply.
13These peaks in coal supply are identified using the c.1817 distribution of adult male
coalworkers; they align with the coalfields at Newcastle and Lancashire.
20
5 Equilibrium Outcomes
Individual simulation outcomes are analytical solutions that depend on in-
dividual realisations of technology shocks at each point in space over time.
As such, there is some volatility in average growth rates that results from
discretising the [0, 1] geography into 500 ‘counties’ and manufacturing can
appear relatively more volatile by virtue of being an average of fewer discrete
technology shocks. The timing of takeoff can vary slightly between individual
simulations based on the same initial conditions and parameters.
Figures 4 report 150 periods of an individual simulation outcome. The
panels of each figure depict different aspects of the equilibrium outcome and
we refer to a panel of a figure as Figure f.r.c where f is the figure number,
r is row and c is column.
Figure 4.1.1 reports the growth rate of output in each sector averaged
across all locations; blue is manufacturing growth, red is agriculture and
green is the aggregate growth rate. The thick lines are six-period moving
averages of the growth rates. There is initially a slow takeoff in agricultural
productivity. Higher consumption reduces the marginal utility from consum-
ing agricultural goods and increases the demand for manufactured goods.
Initially, that increased demand is supplied by expanding the land used for
manufacturing to the low-productivity North, as can be seen in Figure 4.1.2.
That shift in land use toward manufacturing initially reduces the aggregate
productivity of manufacturing firms, as can be seen in after t = 40 in Figure
4.2.1 which reports aggregate productivity in each sector. Once enough labor
has shifted out of agriculture, at t = 61, some firms reach a scale sufficient
to overcome the fixed costs to innovation and begin to innovate in manufac-
turing. Thereafter, the decline average productivity in manufacturing slows
before turning upwards. Figure 4.2.2 depicts the stock of excess supply in
manufacturing, HM(ℓ, t) at each location, where different lines are drawn for
different time periods (higher lines are earlier time periods).
Figure 4.3.1 reports the average relative price of manufactured goods.
While agriculture is the only sector innovating, the relative price of man-
ufactured goods increases; once the takeoff occurs, the faster rate of tech-
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nological progress in manufacturing means that its relative price eventually
declines. Figure 4.3.2 depicts employment share in agriculture (red) as well
as the share of consumption that is manufacturing goods (green).
The locations of innovation are as follows: Agricultural innovation hap-
pens in the South from t = 0 because of the relatively high agricultural
productivity there and also because of the large population of consumers in
London. Takeoff in manufacturing, i.e., the first investment in new technolo-
gies, happens at t = 61 and ℓ = 305.14 This location represents a compromise
between distance from the population centre, the cost of energy across space
and the initial productivity in manufacturing. Despite the advantage that
London has in its relatively high initial manufacturing productivity, the en-
ergy costs involved in investing in energy-intensive technologies are too great
and so the industrial revolution begins in the North.
5.1 The model against data
We first compare the model implications against aggregate data for the first
industrial revolution. Figure 5 depicts the simulation output against data
for growth, employment shares, wages, relative prices and land rents.15 The
simulation output matches aspects of the data quite well. In particular, the
observed takeoff in growth matches the speed and magnitude of the takeoff
in the simulation aggregate growth rate. We match the small change in
employment share closely. The long-run share in agriculture in the model
is 20% and so clearly the assumption of Stone-Geary preferences would not
be adequate to match the decline of the agricultural employment share into
the twentieth century. Relative prices are somewhat more volatile than in
the data, at first increasing slightly because of the takeoff in agricultural
productivity. Once the industrial innovation begins, the relative price of
manufacturing declines rapidly. As will be seen in Section 7, some of the
decline in the relative price is mitigated by incorporating international trade.
The simulation path of real wages and land rents tracks the takeoff in the
14Over thirty simulations, the average takeoff time is 57.0; standard deviation of 3.3.
15See Appendix A for information on data sources.
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data and the model implications for price of manufacturing relative to wages
peaks around the same point as in the data.
We can also use the occupational geography data in Shaw-Taylor et al.
(2010a) for c.1817 and 1861 to evaluate the model performance in predicting
the spatial distribution of labor in each sector. As with the c.1710 data, we
calculate the distribution of labor along an interval. Since in the model there
is no population growth, the total labor supply in the data is normalised
across the three periods.
Figure 6 shows the change in the distribution of labor in the primary
sector. Technological change in agriculture is located in the South around
London, which matches the historical literature described above. Since sub-
stantial portions of land which in the data are at least partly agricultural are
given up wholly to manufacturing firms, the model implies that agricultural
labor is somewhat more spatially concentrated than is evident in the data.
Figure 7 depicts the distribution of labor in the secondary sector against
the data. The location of the manufacturing hotspot fits the data very well
and, for 1817, comes close to the right magnitude. The disappearance of
London as a secondary producer is notable. One issue is that we are com-
paring data for multiple secondary sectors with a model that has only one
secondary sector. As discussed above, the one sector that drove the indus-
trial revolution was textiles. Figure 8 depicts the same model output against
(rescaled) data for textiles.16 Clearly, the model does a good job of matching
the data for textiles alone. Both the location and magnitude are captured at
both 1817 and 1861, while the disappearance of London fits the data.
That specialisation of the North into industry and South into agriculture
suggests an important role for the tertiary sector, especially in wholesaling
and transportation of goods longer average distances. A major conclusion of
the Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) study is that, in the nineteenth century, the
tertiary sector was by far the most dynamic in terms of its share of labor
across the country. However, the model generates complete long-run special-
16The sample of observations for c.1710 in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010b) represent the
North of England better than the South. While the estimates for the North are thus
relatively reliable, they possibly under-estimate textile employment in the South West.
See Randall (1991) for a discussion of the two textile regions.
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isation of the South in agriculture and North industry which is not consistent
with the nineteenth century experience in England. The importance of this
initial specialisation, the later spread of high-productivity industry to the
South and the role of the tertiary sector are all important topics for fur-
ther study. For now, Sections 6 to 8 considers a number of counterfactual
experiments.17
6 Geographical Counterfactuals
Figure 9 gives the original distribution in Panel A and three transformations
that keep the same aggregate average productivity but vary the distribution
of that productivity across space. In all the geographical counterfactuals we
keep agricultural productivity and all other parameters as in Section 5.
Distribution B simply flattens the whole distribution. Again, the South
specialises in agriculture while the North specialises in manufacturing. Since
the manufacturing labor previously concentrated in London is now evenly
spread over Northern locations, nearly all manufacturing firms located in the
North are of a scale sufficient to engage in investments in innovation. They
also benefit from the low energy costs as they sit on top of the source of
cheap energy and so industrial takeoff happens immediately and widely.
The effect of redistributing the labor in London appears to dominate the
outcome in Panel B. In contrast, Panel C of Figure 9 retains the productivity
peak in London and flattens the productivity distribution elsewhere.18 In the
short-run, the model behaves as in the baseline case; London dominates sec-
ondary output with agricultural innovation situated nearby and slow growth
in aggregate output. Since agricultural productivity is relatively low in the
Northern and Southern tips, small areas of manufacturing productivity exist
there. In the absence of the regions of relatively high productivity in the
North, at no point over these 150 periods do firms engage in manufactur-
ing innovation expenditure. As agricultural innovation proceeds, the relative
17Simulation output for the counterfactual exercises is generally not reported for reasons
of space, but is available from the author.
18London is, for this counterfactual, defined as ℓ ∈ [101 : 174].
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price of manufacturing increases over time and the rental value of land to
manufacturers increases. The spread of manufacturing land takes the form
of the Northern and Southern regions expanding toward London, but there
is no investment in innovation by manufacturing firms.
Finally, Panel D of Figure 9 reports the distribution of productivity which
results from applying a smoothing filter to the original manufacturing pro-
ductivity distribution.19 The equilibrium outcome with the smoothed dis-
tribution behaves as with the distribution in Panel C: There is substantial
manufacturing output in London and some agricultural innovation in the
South. Greater output of manufacturing goods again comes via expand-
ing land used by manufacturing firms, except now they are located atop
the relatively high-productivity manufacturing areas. Despite some peaks in
manufacturing productivity in the North, they are not sufficient to generate
endogenous growth in manufacturing over the 150 periods.
The role of geographically-small regions of high productivity growth –
whether it be London dominating early employment in manufacturing or
the concentration of productivity in the North of England – appear key to
explaining an industrial takeoff.
7 International Trade
The UK was a net importer of foodstuffs and a net exporter of manufactured
goods by the end of the eighteenth century. Net exports of manufactures
were around 6.2% of national output in 1700, increasing to around 17% of
output by 1855.20 We consider the impact of this trade on takeoff, as well as
ask whether the location of the entry of that trade into England could have
affected the location or timing of takeoff.
Many factors outside of the model determined the level of trade into
and out of England during this period. As such, we consider the impact of
19We use a Savitzky-Golay filter with polynomial order 3 and frame size 61.
20We use trade and population data from Davis (1962) and Mitchell (1988) to construct
a series for net trade per capita. See Table A. The correlation coefficient between net
exports of manufactures and net imports of agricultural goods is 0.98.
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international trade on equilibrium outcomes in a simple way by assuming an
exogenous flow of trade to ports. Exports which depart at a location ℓ can be
modelled as an exogenous decrease in the excess supply function, HM(ℓ, t).
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In the model we approximate the increase in trade over time by a linear trend
fitted to the data.22 We calculate the net international manufacturing trade
at a location ℓ in time t as a proportion of period t− 1 total manufacturing
output using the linear trend in manufacturing openness.
We first consider the impact that trade through London (location ℓ =
135) has on the timing of the takeoff. Under the same parameterisation as
Table 4, introducing trade causes takeoff to happen around twenty five years
earlier. The presence of a significant external demand for manufactured
goods increases the relative price of manufacturing, hastens the shift of labor
into manufacturing and means that Northern firms reach the scale sufficient
for takeoff earlier than they would otherwise do. For comparison with the
simulation in Section 5, we increase the fixed cost of manufacturing to ψ1,M =
0.999 which locates the timing of takeoff closer to that consistent with the
data. Average prices of manufactured goods are slightly higher because of
the additional demand for manufactured output but do not clearly match
the data better. The shift of labor out of agriculture is now much faster,
declining to nearly 20% over the 150 year simulation.
We can also consider the role of the location of the imports on the timing
of takeoff. As Armstrong and Bagwell (1983) describes, although the eigh-
teenth century coastal trade was dominated by London, by 1841 the port at
Liverpool (ℓ = 295) was the third most important (after London and the coal
port at Newcastle). Exogenous exports will tend to increase the relative price
of manufacturing around the port, an effect that will be exacerbated if that
port is a significant distance from the major production centre (in this case,
London) since more output is lost in transportation. Increasing the relative
21Modelling net imports of agricultural products would have the same impact on the
model as exports of manufacturing products. By construction of the excess supply function
we know that, at each location ℓ, the sum of excess supply in one good up to ℓmust be offset
by an excess demand for the other good up to that ℓ, i.e., HA(ℓ, t) + pM (ℓ, t)HM (ℓ, t) = 0
for all (ℓ, t).
22Using this linear approximation improves computation of simulation outcomes.
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price will make it more likely that local firms will reach a scale sufficient to
induce investment in innovation. Based on the reparameterised trade model,
there is little impact of locating all international trade at ℓ = 295 instead of
ℓ = 135. Based on thirty simulations with each export location, the mean
takeoff date when goods depart from London is t = 66.7; exports through
Liverpool yield a mean takeoff date of t = 65.8.23 The lack of an effect may
be because trade is not substantial enough to have an impact, or because of
the relatively low transport cost assumed for the production goods.
8 Policy
The model as calibrated in Section 4 allows us to ask what role simple poli-
cies might play in affecting when an industrial takeoff begins. We look at the
effect of three industrial policies on the location and timing of takeoff: First,
subsidies to innovation; second, subsidies to land use; and third, infrastruc-
ture development that reduces the costs of transporting coal.
We characterise the time and location of industrial takeoff as the time
and location of the first innovative activity in manufacturing. Simulations
of the model parameterised according to Table 3 generate an average (over
thirty simulations) takeoff date of t = 57, with a standard deviation of 3.3
years. Takeoff occurs at location ℓ = 305. We would expect that subsidies
to technology adoption in manufacturing would bring forward the date of
industrial takeoff. Given the role of agricultural innovation in releasing labor
into manufacturing, we can also expect a role for subsidies to agricultural
innovation. To model a policy that encourages innovation in a particular
sector, we reduce the innovation fixed cost by 5% of the value in Table 3.
The results are given in Table 4, rows II-III. A cut in the fixed cost of agri-
cultural innovation generates a broader takeoff in agricultural productivity
and brings forward the industrial takeoff by just over three years without
affecting the location of takeoff. Reducing the fixed cost of manufacturing
has a larger effect, bringing forward the date of takeoff by over fourteen years
23The standard deviation of the takeoff time is 7.2 years.
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on average. Subsidising manufacturing innovation also has an effect on the
location of takeoff, shifting the centre of the industrial productivity growth
further North, away from London. This suggests that the main driver of the
location of takeoff is not the proximity to the major market, but the price of
coal in the location of a possible industrial takeoff.
Table 4: Policy Interventions
takeoff, t s.d. ℓ
I baseline 57.0 3.3 305
II 0.95 · ψA,1 53.6 2.8 305
III 0.95 · ψM,1 43.3 1.8 324–5
IV 1.01 ·RM 89.3 22.6 305
V 1.01 ·RA 57.8 3.3 305
Numbers are based on thirty runs each.
To model policies directed at land use, we introduce a 1% subsidy to the
market rent paid by a sector. As can be seen in Table 4 row IV, encouraging
manufacturing land use significantly delays takeoff on average, and makes
its arrival less predictable. The gains from spatial-concentration of manu-
facturing activity appear to be lost when industrial land use is subsidised.
Applying a subsidy to agricultural land use has no discernible impact of
takeoff, however. In the baseline output (Figure 4), non-innovating manu-
facturing firms emerge in the North in advance of the takeoff in innovation.
Subsidies to agricultural land use may slightly delay this shift into manu-
facturing land, but it can also make it more concentrated spatially; the net
effect on takeoff is limited. Subsidies to manufacturing land use, however,
bring forward the emergence of non-innovating manufacturing firms in the
North and make them spatially less concentrated. In these simulations, the
lower concentration matters more as firms do not reach the scale sufficient
for innovation until much later, on average.
Finally, we can consider the role of transport costs. As discussed in
Section 2, the historical evidence on the spatial distribution of energy prices
implies that the costs of transporting coal were significant and not uniform
across the country. We modelled energy prices as increasing in the direction
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of London, with a relatively low transport cost North of ℓ = 305, in a way
that reflects the evidence for the early eighteenth century. Investment in new
transport infrastructure became increasing important into the nineteenth
century (see, for example, Trew, 2010). We can ask how much lower transport
costs would have to be South of ℓ = 305 for industrial takeoff to occur close to
London (ℓ = 135): We need to reduce the price of energy at London by 56%
in order to generate an industrial revolution there. Focusing infrastructure
spending on the most significant population centre does not, in this case,
seem to be a cost-effective means of inducing industrial takeoff.
9 Concluding Remarks
Asking why the industrial revolution happened where it did can help us
understand why it happened at all. A model of spatial takeoff, calibrated
to new occupational data for the early eighteenth century, is able to match
the location and magnitude of the industrial takeoff, as well as a number
of other aggregate facts. The importance of the spatial concentration of
economic activity for takeoff is clear from the geographical counterfactuals. A
number of policy experiments suggest a relatively limited role for government
in bringing forward the date of industrial takeoff, but some clear ability to
delay it through subsidies to manufacturing land use.
There are a number of issues that merit further study. That the tertiary
sector is the most dynamic in the data suggests that it should be modelled
explicitly. This seems particularly important given the role played by the lo-
cations of coal and the costliness of its transportation. While the importance
of infrastructural development to growth has been found in both historical
and modern contexts,24 a model of spatial takeoff that incorporates a role
for investments in infrastructure could imply optimal policies over where to
concentrate infrastructural spending to hasten takeoff or to benefit long-run
growth. There is evidence25 that during the first industrial revolution the
24See, for example, Caldero´n and Serve´n (2004), Atack et al. (2008) and Donaldson
(2010)
25See Shea (2012) and Trew (2010).
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finance of those infrastructures was also spatially concentrated around the
early hotspots of activity. Understanding that could add to our understand-
ing of the relationship between financial and economic development more
generally.
The demand for the tertiary sector is, in part, a function of spatial spe-
cialisation. While the model can capture the deindustrialisation of the South
in advance of the takeoff in per capita growth, it cannot account for the
later increases in Southern industrial employment observed in the nineteenth
century. Modelling these more complicated changes over time would be nec-
essary for a proper study of the tertiary sector. Identifying the role played by
London – through its demand for energy and its supply of secondary sector
outputs – in the timing of the industrial revolution also appears important.
Finally, the model is initialised at c.1710 based on data that suggests
an already relatively high level of manufacturing productivity in the region
that became the industrial hotspot. Understanding why the geography of
England appeared as it did in the early eighteenth century is necessary to
explain fully why the industrial revolution happened in a small part of the
North of England.
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A Data Sources
Variable Description
Per capita growth The Crafts and Harley (1992) measures of British aggregate per
capita growth cited in Mokyr (2004).
Employment shares From Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010, Table 4), the current best guesses
for England’s male occupational sectoral distribution. Regional
shares are from op. cit. (Table 6); Northern counties are Cheshire,
Lancashire, East Riding of Yorkshire, North Riding of Yorkshire
and West Riding of Yorkshire. Southern counties are Bedfordshire,
Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, Northamp-
tonshire, Oxfordshire, Rutland and Wiltshire. The numbers used
in the figures omit the tertiary figures, i.e., they are the pri-
mary:secondary ratio over time.
Relative prices We construct relative prices as in Yang and Zhu (2009). The agri-
cultural price index is the annual series ‘Farm Index’ from Clark
(2003, Appendix Table 4). The manufacturing price is composed
of the Schumpeter-Gilboy and the Rousseuax price indices from
Mitchell (1962, Prices Tables 1 and 3). The relative price series is
the ratio of decadal averages of each of the annual series.
Real wages Aggregate real wage index from the data collected in Clark (2002,
Table 1). The price of manufacturing relative to wages is con-
structed with decadal averages of each series. Alternative perspec-
tives on the real wage series are available in, for example, Allen
(2007), but the comparisons between the simulation output and
data are similar.
Land rents An index of land rents including local taxes paid by property oc-
cupiers from the data collected in Clark (2002, Table 1)
International trade The trade data for foodstuffs and manufactures over the period
1699-1701 to 1772-4 are for England from Davis (1962); that for
1785-1855 are for Great Britain from Mitchell (1988). The data is
deflated using the relative price series constructed as in Yang and
Zhu (2009) (see above) and converted into per capita terms using
population data in Mitchell (1988). Harley (2004) has exports as
a share of national output at 20% in 1885. We use that with the
Crafts and Harley (1992) per capita growth data to create the share
of net exports of manufacturing.
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B Figures
Figure 1: The England Interval, [0, 500]
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Figure 2: Primary and Secondary Employment, c.1710
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Figure 3: Initial Productivity, Primary (left) and Secondary (right)
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Figure 4: Model Output
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Figure 5: Model (thick) vs. Data (thin), 1710–1860
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Figure 6: Model vs. primary employment at 1710, 1817 and 1861
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Figure 7: Model vs. secondary employment at 1710, 1817 and 1861
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Figure 8: Model vs. textiles employment (rescaled) at 1710, 1817 and 1861
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Figure 9: Alternative Initial Manufacturing Productivity Distributions
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